I joined Coperniq in mid-2025 as a Product Growth Lead, working remotely from Pakistan with a small team and high expectations. The kind of setup where you’re either useful fast or you drown.
The timing mattered. Around that period, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act hit the solar world and changed everything overnight. Residential solar tax credits were set to end after 2025, and the rules around credits for solar and wind got tighter and more time-boxed. If you’re a solar business selling only one thing, you feel that pressure immediately. If you’re a contractor doing solar, roofing, HVAC, and service work, you’ve got options.
Coperniq’s product was already quietly moving beyond “solar software,” but our public story hadn’t caught up. So my work became a mix of reframing the company, rebuilding the website and funnel, creating proof, getting tracking in shape, and building a practical ABM motion Sales could actually use.
What I walked into
On paper, the job was product growth. In reality, it was “be the person who connects the dots.”
The product was deeper than the website suggested. Coperniq could handle complex workflows (work orders, scheduling, service, payments, homeowner app) but the website still gave “solar EPC tool” energy. The company wanted a non-solar pipeline, and that wasn’t a vague aspiration. It was a survival move. Multi-trade contractors were the obvious next buyer.
The demo funnel leaked badly. People started the form, then disappeared after the first step. The confirmation state was confusing since it looked like “cool, you’re done” when you weren’t. Tracking wasn’t clean enough to make decisions with confidence. Some UTMs came through sometimes. “How did you hear about us?” was free-text chaos. Offline conversion feedback to paid platforms was not there.
Sales needed proof and targets. They had good stories in their heads and in Gong calls, but not enough packaged proof to reuse. And culturally, I learned quickly that direct feedback was normal. If something wasn’t good, Abdullah would tell you. No sugarcoating. That’s fine by me—I’d rather know.
Learning the product like a user, not a marketer
Before I touched the copy, I wanted to understand the product in a way where I could explain it without sounding like a brochure. So I joined daily design meetings and product demos, created FRDs for each feature to bring structure, poked around the platform, and asked annoying questions.
One moment that stuck: even the word “client” felt confusing in the UI because it didn’t map cleanly to how contractors think i.e. homeowner vs org vs contact. I called that out. Abdullah agreed it needed tightening. That kind of small language mismatch shows up everywhere: marketing, UI, onboarding, sales calls.
I kept saying the same thing internally: this product is a hidden gem, but it’s hard to “get” from the outside. That became the core of my work—making it easier to get.
Repositioning beyond solar without pretending we weren’t in solar
I didn’t want to erase solar. Solar was still a major wedge. But it couldn’t be the only story anymore. The OBBB law changes were the backdrop. A lot of installers were going to have to adapt, and the contractors who’d win were the ones who could sell and deliver multiple services.
The question became: how do we talk like a platform built for contractors, not a solar-only tool?
I rewrote the core narrative around complex ops. Jobs don’t move linearly, they stall on permits, inspections, scheduling, inventory, collections. Multi-team coordination from sales to PM to install to service. Visibility into what’s blocked, what’s next, what’s overdue. End-to-end rather than “a tool for one stage.” Then I built the website structure around that story so it wasn’t just words floating on the homepage.
Building a website as our main marketing & sales asset
Sales teams don’t care if the website is pretty. They care if it answers objections fast.
So I treated the website like a sales asset library.
I shipped landing pages for solar, energy, construction, and trades. A homepage refresh. Pricing page. Features list. AI landing page. Comparison updates. Case study collection with individual clients. Changelog and integrations pages. Product cadence newsletter and announcement assets. Business listing profiles on G2, Trustpilot, Clutch, Capterra, GetApp for visibility.
For landing pages, I wrote the copy and also cared about the stuff people forget: layout and scannability, what information comes first, where proof shows up, how CTAs appear on mobile, what fields matter in forms versus what’s friction versus what’s noise. Some of these pages were built to be used directly for paid search and retargeting. The bar was: could I run ads to this tomorrow and not be embarrassed?
Pricing pages are uncomfortable because they force clarity, but they also reduce junk demos. I built a pricing page that gave enough direction to qualify people without locking the company into a rigid public promise. Then I built a features list that didn’t read like a dump of nouns. It connected features to outcomes and workflows.
Comparison pages and competitor framing were part of the plan too. The goal wasn’t trash-talking competitors. It was helping a buyer answer: why is this worth switching for? So I updated comparisons to match what we were actually shipping—Workflows 2.0, AI pieces, ops workflows.
Fixing the demo funnel and tracking
This is where I got a bit obsessive, because conversion leaks are painful when you’re paying for traffic.
People were dropping between “enter email” and full demo form completion. Attribution was a mess. UTMs were inconsistent. “How did you hear about us?” was free-text, which is useless for reporting. And paid platforms didn’t get real feedback on lead quality.
I rewrote the form experience so it was unambiguous what was happening. Not “brand voice” sentences like “Step 1: confirm your email” and “Step 2: a few details so we can route you to the right person.” Clear confirmation states that didn’t trick people into thinking they were done. It sounds small. It isn’t. It was responsible for a huge chunk of the drop-off.
I added tracking capture that stored utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign, utm_content, utm_term. And I treated UTMs like a first-class property in the CRM, not something that lives in GA only. The mental model was: UTMs tell you what brought the person in, the dropdown tells you what they think brought them in, and together you have a usable picture instead of arguing over which report is “right.”
Then I documented the data flow so Sales stages actually fed back into paid. This part mattered because a cheap lead is not a good lead. We wanted campaigns to learn from SQLs and opportunities, not raw form fills. So as leads moved through stages in Close, that signal could be sent back as offline conversion events.
Two hard outcomes:
- Demo funnel drop-off between email capture and full form completion dropped by 73%.
- Qualified demo requests from non-solar leads increased by 70%.
Those aren’t vanity metrics. They change the shape of the pipeline.
Case studies that didn’t sound like press releases
I don’t like case studies that read like “Customer was sad. Then they used product. Now they are happy.”
So I built a template that forced specificity: what the company did, what the messy parts of their operation were, what Coperniq replaced or simplified, which workflows actually changed, and what improved in language contractors use.
I listened to Gong calls, pulled out real details, and wrote case studies for Tron Solar, Sunstate Solar, and Sameday Solar. Built the collection page on the website, then tied those into sales outreach. This helped Sales because it gave them a way to say: here’s someone like you, here’s what they changed, here’s what didn’t break. I planned additional case studies plus PDF versions as a sales pack because Sales loves something they can attach and forward.
I created a PDF asset from these case studies to create a more visual proof of the benefits our clients got from using Coperniq and later it was used for both the 30 day touchpoints outbound campaign as well as sending that to our prospects.
Announcing the latest AI features the trades industry needed
We were building real AI-adjacent stuff: AI receptionist ideas, AI copilot concepts, autofill from docs, smarter workflows. But if you just say “AI,” everyone tunes out.
So I wrote messaging around: what job does it do, who does it help, what’s the before/after? After-hours calls that don’t get missed. Work orders that get created without someone copy-pasting details. Collections follow-ups that happen without awkward manual chasing.
I shipped a Coperniq AI landing page, AI section updates for the site, and framing for product announcements –AI copilot, AI receptionist, plus other releases like client portal 2.0, sales app 2.0, telephony. I also worked on an AI ebook concept as a campaign anchor, but with a bias toward making it useful, not loud.
ABM that Sales could run without hating their life
This came after the foundations were less broken. Once the website and funnel were cleaned up, we had the question: who do we want Sales talking to next, and how do we make that easier?
So I ran an ABM pilot based on permit signals, not random firmographic lists. I cleaned a contractor list domains, duplicates, dead sites. Used Shovels permit API to pull last-12-month signals: permits count, dominant trade tag (solar/HVAC/roof), average job value, last permit date. Built a contact waterfall in Clay: LeadMagic to Findymail to DropContact to Wiza. Verified emails via ZeroBounce. Gated accounts with a simple rule: at least five permits in last 12 months AND at least one verified decision-maker email.
I wrote a five-touch, five-day sequence (email, LinkedIn, voicemail) with permit-based opening lines, persona-specific angles (CEO vs sales vs ops), and progressive CTAs (short diagnosis call to short demo to value asset). Then I handed Sales something they could actually use: prioritized account sheet, verified contacts, message drafts with real signals baked in.
Even without perfect downstream reporting, it was immediately beneficial for Sales because it reduced manual research and gave them sharper opening lines than “Hi, I noticed you’re in solar.”
Docs and in-app tours
I spent a lot of time making the product easier to understand. Wrote and edited docs for Workflows 2.0, Trades, roles and permissions, CSV import/export, SmartViews, and other “how this actually works” topics. Used Chameleon for small in-app tours and mini demos. Created interactive demo tours with Navattic for onboarding clients.
This work matters because it reduces the gap between what marketing promises and what onboarding delivers. It also made me better at writing website copy because I wasn’t guessing how features behaved. I’d written the docs for them.
How I worked internally
A lot of my job was “make this shippable.” I pushed for a simple weekly rhythm (shared Docs and Sheets, clear priorities). I took on marketing design work where needed because product design bandwidth was focused on the app. I sat in the middle of Sales, Product, CS, and paid -mostly to remove confusion and keep language consistent.
I owned end-to-end product announcements (external launch emails, landing page updates, in-app messaging) aligning Product, Sales, and CS on narrative, timing, and rollout plan. Led launch planning and distribution: internal enablement to customer comms to post-launch adoption follow-ups, ensuring consistent messaging across channels.
I wrote and maintained internal PRDs and specs in collaboration with Product and Design (problem framing, user stories, acceptance criteria) to reduce rework and accelerate shipping. Created internal release notes and change logs for Sales and CS, translating product changes into “what changed, why it matters, how to position it.”
I built and updated customer-facing product documentation (help center articles, onboarding guides, SOPs) improving self-serve clarity and reducing reliance on support. Produced product walkthrough assets: in-app tours, demo scripts, and one-pagers to shorten time-to-value and improve rollout consistency.
What I’m proud of
The simplest way I’d sum up my time at Coperniq so far: I helped move the company from “solar tool” toward a multi-trade contractor platform by rebuilding the story, the website, the demo funnel, proof assets, tracking, and a practical ABM motion—so Sales could have better conversations with the right accounts, with cleaner context, and fewer leaks between interest and a real opportunity.